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NOTES
The Constitutionality of the 1972 Amendment to Title VIl's
Exemption for Religions Organizations
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of religion.1 Prior to 1972 this ban did
not apply to the hiring of individuals to perform work connected
with the "religious activities" of a "religious corporation, association, or society."2 In 1972 the exemption was broadened to include
all of the activities of such organizations.8 The constitutionality of
the broadened exemption was questioned by the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Kinfts GardenJ Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission.4
King's Garden, a nonprofit, interdenominational religious organization dedicated _to spreading Christianity, is the licensee of
two radio stations in Edmonds, Washington.ti The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) found that King's Garden was discriminating on religious grounds and ordered submission of a
statement of future hiring practices and policies.6 King's Garden
sought review of the FCC order, contending that the exemption
contained in title VII established a national policy that should.
control the mandate of the FCC to regulate broadcasters as public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires. 7 The court refused to
I. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (I) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or othenvise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em•
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin •• , ,"
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1970).
2. "This title shall not apply ••• to a religious corporation, association, or society
with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association or society of its religious activities or to an educational institution with respect to the employment of
individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such institution." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 25, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-I (Supp. II, 1972). The fair employment practices laws of some states
still contain exemptions substantially the same as the original federal exemption. E.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 67-5910(1) (1973); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344:.090(2) (1970).
3. "This title shall not apply ••• to a religious corporation, association, educational
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.'' Equal Opportunities Act ol
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (Supp. II, 1972)). Similar exemptions are contained in some
state fair employment practices legislation. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN, § 41-1462 (Supp.
1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 20 (Supp. 1974).
4. 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974).
5. 498 F.2d at 52.
6. 498 F.2d at 52.
7. 498 F.2d at 53 n.4. 0~ the mandate of the FCC, see, for example, 42 U.S.C,
§§ 303, 307, 309(a) (1970).
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"engraft the 1972 exemption onto the Comn:tlssion;s
rules'; 8
because of concern that the exemption violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment and the equal protection guarantee of
the fifth amendment, and because ". . . Congress ha[d] given abso~
lutely no indication that it wished to impose the exemption upon
the FCC." 9 The court held that the FCC's more limited exception,
allowing religious discrimination only 1\Tith respect to "the hiring of
persons whose work is . . . connected with the espousal of the
licensee's religious views,"10 was broad enough to protect the rights
of King's Garden under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.11
Because the court held the title VII exemption inapplicable, its
discussion of the exemption's constitutionality is only dictum.
Nevertheless, concern over the exemption's constitutionality may
have influenced the court's holding, and Chief Judge Bazelon based
his concurrence solely on his agreement 1\Tith the majority that the
exemption was a violation of the establishment clause of the first
amendment.12
This note 1\Till examine the constitutionality of the title VII
exemption for religious associations, focusing on the extent to which
the exemption is required by the free exercise clause and the extent
to which it must be limited to avoid conflict with the establishment
clause.18 The religion clauses will be considered solely in the context of the private business sector;· this note will not consider the
possibility that the establishment clause would require a narrower
8. 498 F.2d at 53.
9. 498 F.2d at 53. Looking at legislative history, the court held that the title VII
exemption was intended to immunize only "those activities which had been traditionally free of all government regulation"; that broadcasters are not trnly private institutions, but rather "public trustees" subject to many "FCC-imposed obligations
inapplicable to the private sector generally"; and that there was no evidence that Congress wished "to upset this well-established doctrine." 498 F.2d at 59.
10. 498 F.2d at 59, quoting Anderson, M F.C.C.2d 937-38, 24 P &: F RADIO REG. 2D
281-82 (1972).
11. 498 F.2d at 60. The court acknowledged that if, in applying its exemption, the
FCC were to construe the terms "espousal" and "religious views" in an overly narrow
fashion, King's Garden's first amendment rights might be infringed, 498 F.2d at 60,
but the application point was not before the court. 498 F .2d at 59.
For an example of the FCC's interpretation of its rule, see National Religious
Broadcasters, Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 451, 27 P &: F RADIO REG. 2D 875 (1973).
12. 498 F.2d at 61.
13. The argument raised by the King's Garden court, 498 F.2d at 57, that the exemption violates the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment, cf. Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), by discriminating between religious and secular organizations does not seem to deepen the analysis. An exemption that satisfies the conflicting requirements of the first amendment shonld not be subject to fifth amendment
attack; in an area where the free exercise and establishment clauses point in opposite
directions, the free exercise foundation for such an exemption should justify the statutory discrimination as long as the exemption does not contravene the establishment
clause. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 44:9 n.14 (1971).
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exemption for a quasi-public institution, such as a broadcast licensee
or a religious association receiving public funds.14
Without some exemption, title VII's proscription on religious
discrimination in employment would clearly infringe on the free
exercise of religion. A Baptist congregation, for example, would be
prevented from discriminating on the basis of religion in hiring its
minister. Such a prohibition would contravene the Supreme Court's
holding that the free exercise clause prohibits the state from regulating "church administration, the operation of churches, [or] the
appointment of clergy."10 Moreover, state regulation of the churchminister relationship could violate the establishment clause by involving government too deeply in the affairs of religious organizations.16 In McClure v. Salvation Army,11 a Salvation Army officer
charged that organization with sex discrimination. Finding that her
position was equivalent to that of a minister, the court held that
title VII does not apply to a church-minister employment relationship because a contrary interpretation would raise serious constitutional problems by causing "the State to intrude upon matters of
church administration and government which have so many times
before been proclaimed to be matters of singular ecclesiastical concern."18 It is also clear that government cannot forbid racial discrimination in the employment of clergy.19 It is not clear, however,
whether the complete immunity from governmental regulation extends to employees other than priests, ministers, rabbis, and other
religious leaders whose selection is of vital importance to the practice of an organization's religion.
With regard to such other employees, the free exercise clause
and the establishment clause seem to pose conflicting requirements
for state regulation of religious employment discrimination. 20 The
King's Garden court found that the original title VII exemption14. See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Note, Public Control o/
Private Sectarian Institutions Receiving Public Funds, 63 MiCH. L, REY. 142 (1964),
15. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North
America, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952).
_16. Cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l, 16 (1947).
17. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied because petition not timely filed, 409 U.S.
896 (1972).
18. 460 F.2d at 560.
19, Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation I:
Employers, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 907, 934-35 (1967). See Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp.,
494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974). While filibustering against the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, Senator Ervin contended that subjecting religious organizations to any of the strictures of title VII would violate the constitutional command of
separation of church and state, Il8 CoNG, REc. 1977-91 (1972).
20. The tension between the two clauses has often been recognized. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,416 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring),
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permitting discrimination in the hiring of individuals to perform
work connected with the religious activities of a religious association-satisfied the conflicting requirements of the two clauses.21 It
is submitted that the court's dictum underestimates the extent to
which government proscription of religious discrimination interferes with the free exercise of religion and overestimates the extent
to which the- 1972 exemption establishes religion.
Religious discrimination by a sect in hiring persons for nonreligious activities may assist its members in practicing their faith or
spreading the sect's doctrine. For example, suppose a small sect has
been losing membership because its adherents spend all of their
time, except for one hour of biweekly worship, in a society dominated by secularism and competing religions. The sect might open
a factory for the purpose of employing its adherents and enabling
them to work with coreligionists in an atmosphere conducive to
preserving their faith. Or a religious sect running a secular business,
and not generally discriminating with respect to religion in its
hiring, might nevertheless have a work force composed primarily
of adherents of that sect. In order to protect the faith of its employees, it may desire to discriminate against job applicants whose
religious beliefs require them to proselytize their fellow workers.22
The business activity involved in each example, especially the
second, is not easily characterized as religious. Yet extending free
exercise clause protection may be appropriate. Although the first
amendment gives no religion the right to governmental aid in keeping its adherents segregated from the intellectual ferment and
dialogue of the outside world,23 a religious organization has a legitimate interest in using its mrn resources to shield its members from
the importunities of the secular world or of competing faiths.24
Today a religion may find it exceedingly difficult to isolate its mem21. 498 F.2d at 56.
22. In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress may have intended to allow
religious discrimination in this situation. See EEOC, LEGISLATIVE H1sroRY OF TITLES
VII AND IX OF CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 3208 (1968) (remarks of Congressman
Whitten). Such defensive use of religious discrimination may often arise in situations
in which it is difficult to term the activity involved "religious," but in which a free
exercise right is clearly involved.
23. CJ. Committee for Pub. Educ. &: Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24. CJ. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also Note, Abduction, Religious
Sects, and the Free Exercise Clause, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 623, 635-36 (1974).
An individual proprietor might wish to hire only adherents of his faith for the
same reasons. Free exercise would thus seem to require an exemption for individuals
as well as for religious organizations. The failure of Congress to grant such an exemption may be no more than an oversight of a situation that rarely occurs. Religions do
not commonly require their adherents not to hire members of another faith. See
Stark &: Glock, Prejudice and the Churches, in PREJUDICE U.S.A. 70 (C. Glock &: E.
Siegelman eds. 1969). Also, many proprietorships will not be covered by title VII because they have fewer than 15 employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
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hers, but it would seem that it has lost some freedom-a type of
freedom that can only be denominated "religious"-if in order to
comply with title VII it is forced to hire those who would proselytize
against it.
In addition, a religious sect may wish to use secular activities as
a means of spreading its influence. For example, a religious group
might wish to employ only members of its mvn sect in a laundry
operated as a showcase of faith. 25 While this motive will seldom be
the sole reason for operating a commercial establishment, it is probably not uncommon for a religious organization to desire that its
members witness their faith or conduct themselves in a manner that
will reflect credit upon the religion in the public eye.26 The King's
Garden court mentioned a professional football club as one activity
of a religious group that would not be entitled to the protection of
the free exercise clause.27 Yet a nondenominational religious organization might sponsor a basketball team composed entirely of
players and coaches deeply committed to their religion. By having
the team play local teams throughout" the country and by publicizing
the religious sponsorship and composition of the team, the organization might hope to counter any notion young people may have that
religion is only for effeminate persons. To cover expenses, or even
to make a pro.fit, such a team might charge spectators a fee.
Whether or not these undertakings are "religious activities," the
religious discrimination in each case is motivated by a desire to
facilitate the exercise or spread of the organization's faith. If the free
exercise clause protects actions taken by a religious organization to
effectuate these purposes, it should protect the employment discrimination in the foregoing examples regardless of the specific
nature of the activity.
It has been argued that the free exercise clause protects only
actions essential to or required by the particular faith involved.28
Such a limitation is unjustifiable.29 The distinction between actions
25. The business involved in Golden Rule Church Assn. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.
719 (1964), seems to have been started solely for this reason.
26. Such a desire was apparently one factor motivating the religious discrimination in King's Garden. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 20-21.
27. 498 F.2d at 54.
28. Comment, The Lord Buildeth and the State Taketh Away-Church Condemna•
tion and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 46 CoLO. L. REv. 43, 48-50 &:
n.53 (1974).
29. Unitarian Church West v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
affd. mem., 474 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds sub nom. McCon•
nell v. Unitarian Church West, 416 U.S. 932 (1974) (upholding the right of a church
to use explicit visual aids in teaching sex education to young adherents); M. KoNVITZ,
RELIGIOUS LIDERTY AND CONSCIENCE 77-79 (1968); Marcus, The Forum of Conscience:
Applying Standards Under the Free Exerdse Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1250•51
(1974).
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that are compelled by one's religious beliefs and actions that merely
facilitate the practice of one's religion is impossible to maintain,
especially with respect to religions that stress the importance of
individual conscience. Although most cases extending constitutional
protection to proselytization80 have involved Jehovah's Witnesses,
for whom proselytization is an important religious tenet,81 that
factor does not seem to have been essential to the decisions.82 Indeed,
if proselytization were protected only for persons whose religion
required it, it could be argued that the state would be aiding the
work of such religions against those that do not make propagation
of the faith an essential element of religious belief and practice.
Such aid would violate the establishment clause by "prefer[ring]
one religion over another."88
The free exercise clause thus seems to cover employment practices designed to facilitate proselytization.84 If free exercise extends
that far, it certainly also covers employment practices designed to
prevent adherents from breaking away from their faith or to enable
The importance to the religion of a given practice might be relevant in balancing
the individual right of free exercise against a state interest advanced to justify overriding the individual right. Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds of Religion and Consdence, 62 KY. L.J. 377, 416-17 (1974). See also text at notes 35-37 infra.
30. E.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
31. H. STROUP, THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES 60-67 (1945).
32. Indeed, this factor was not mentioned by the Court in Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), or in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
Rather, the Court stated that it was protecting a "method of disseminating religious
beliefs" from being "crushed." 319 U.S. at 155.
33. Everson v. 13oard of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Although religious exemptions
have been granted that, as a practical matter, do not benefit all sects equally, e.g.,
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), whatever aid such exemptions give does
not directly affect the competition between sects for adherents.
34. Religious discrimination in employment might have more than one motivation,
but the free exercise clause should cover such discrimination as long as any of the
motives sufficient to cause the discrimination merit protection.
There are types of proselytization that free exercise does not protect. The state may
of course prohibit physically coercive methods of proselytization, such as kidnapping
and torture, because of its compelling interest in ensuring the physical safety of its
citizens. Cf. text at notes 35-37 infra. Economically coercive proselytization presents a
harder problem. For example, a religiously affiliated hospital might hire only adherents of its faith in order to use its economic power as a major employer to induce
the local labor force to adopt its faith. The hospital's claim to free exercise protection should not be dismissed on the ground that such proselytization can produce only
sham conversions. Free exercise would mean little if the government were free to regulate proselytization whenever it believes the methods chosen axe ineffective. On the
one hand, it has been suggested that the activities of missionaries in underdeveloped
countries in establishing schools, hospitals, and clinics may sometimes be a form of
bribery that should not be legally protected. A. K.rusHNASWAMI, A STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN nm MATIER OF RELIGIOUS RlGIITS AND PRACTICES 40 (1960). On the other
hand, it is difficult to find a reasonable means of distinguishing the economic coercion
practiced by the hospital from economically coercive activities that probably should
be protected, such as the dispensation of charity.
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members of a sect to practice their religion more effectively. These
motivations, however, arguably underlie every activity of a religious
organization. It is possible, therefore, to argue that free exercise
requires the full scope of the amended title VII exemption.
This is not to say that free exercise clause coverage ensures constitutional protection. The state may have overriding interests. By
broadening the title VII exemption to include all activities of religious associations, Congress has chosen not to assert any state
interest that might justify infringing on free exercise. Nevertheless,
in discussing the extent to which free exercise requires an exemption to title VII, it is necessary to take into account the state interests that can justify imposing a burden on free exercise. The order
of magnitude such state interests must assume has been described as
"compelling"85 and "of the highest order."86 They are not measured
against an abstract standard, but balanced against the religious
interest involved; thus, the strength of the state interest necessary to
justify an intrusion upon religious belief, practice, or propagation
will vary with the degree to which those interests are endangered.87
There are several interests a state might advance by enacting a
general ban on religious discrimination. It might be argued that a
worker's religious beliefs are generally irrelevant to his job performance,88 and that a ban on religious discrimination therefore has
an economic rationale because hiring based on criteria irrelevant to
productivity detracts from over-all economic production.89 In addition, the state arguably has an interest in creating a society in which
every individual is free to exercise his belief unhampered by private,
as well as governmental, discrimination.40 The concomitant infringement of the individual's right to discriminate as he pleases might be
justified by the belief that a just society fosters good public morale
and avoids the danger of civilian insurrection.
None of these state interests appear to be sufficiently compelling
35. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
36. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). But see Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 384 (1974); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (suggesting that
"substantial" interests are sufficient).
37. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 724-25, 394 P.2d 813, 820, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69, 76 (1964); Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. R.Ev. 327, 345
(1969}; Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development:
Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, BO HARv. L. R.Ev. 1381, 1390 (1967); Note,
supra note 24, at 634. Quite a few factors can enter into the balancing. See Clark, su•
pra; Shetreet, supra note 29, at 410-19.
38. Title VII does recognize that sex and religion may sometimes be relevant, how•
ever. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e} (1970).
39. This argument apparently was not made to Congress in the debate over title
VII. See text at notes 41-42 infra.
40. Cf. Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en bane} (Congress has
power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to punish private conspiracies to
interfere with freedom of worship).
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to justify prohibiting private religious discrimination practiced for
the purpose of furthering an employer's exercise of religion. First,
the fact that Congress broadened the title VII exemption in 1972
suggests that Congress did not find these interests compelling. Nor
does the legislative history of the original title VII enacted in 1964
reveal any congressional belief that compelling state interests justified the narrower exemption, which did not protect private religious
discrimination for the purpose of furthering individual exercise or
propagation of religion unless it was part of a "religious activity."
Almost no attention was directed to the ban on religious discrimination when title VII was passed.41 Second, in the hearings on the 1964
bill, the House Judiciary Committee did not find substantial evidence that religious discrimination in employment was a major
social problem.42 The lack of such evidence weak.ens the force of the
state interest in promoting a just society. Finally, it is probable that
neither state interest extends to situations in which religion is relevant to the legitimate purposes of the employer.
Absent a compelling state interest, free exercise requires an
exemption in title VII at least for employment discrimination
designed to facilitate the exercise or spread of religion. The original
title VII exemption for "religious activities" was therefore too
narrow, and the 1972 amendment exempting all activities of a religious organization perhaps goes beyond what the free exercise clause
requires, although there are probably few activities covered by the
broadened exemption that are not constitutionally protected.43 This
note will now examine the constitutionality of the broadened
exemption under the establishment clause.
The Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the standards
governing establishment clause challenges is found in Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,44 in which
the Court invalidated several-forms of state aid to parochial schools.
The Court stated that "to pass muster under the Establishment
Clause the law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose ... , second, must have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion ... , and, third, must avoid excessive
government entanglement with religion . . . .''45 The title VII
exemption easily satisfies the third prong of the test because it
avoids any governmental regulation of a religious organization's
employment practices. But the Kings Garden court found that the
41. Edwards &: Kaplan, Reiigious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REv. 599, 600 (1971).
42. Id. at 600 n.10.
43. See text following note 34 supra.
44. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
45. 413 U.S. at 773 (citations omitted). A similar standard, couched in somewhat
different language, was set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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broadened exemption failed to satisfy the other two prongs of the
standard.
With respect to the first prong, the court was unable to "conceive what secular purpose is served by the unbounded exemption
enacted in 1972."46 Because the subject matter of both the title VII
proscription and the exemption is religious, the characterization
of the purposes behind the exemption as religious is understandable.
However, a less literal view would include as a secular purpose the
state's purpose of avoiding the imposition of burdens on the practice of religion, whether or not such government noninvolvement
is required by the free exercise clause. The state might desire complete noninvQlvement in order to avoid any unintentional infringe•
ment of free exercise rights or excessive litigation of infringement
claims. If these were the goals of the title VII exemption, the secular
purpose test would be satisfied.
The secular purpose test is also less of a stumbling block if it is
interpreted in light of the phrasing of Epperson v. Arkansas,47 the
last Supreme Court decision prior to Nyquist based squarely on the
purpose test. Epperson makes the purpose to advance or inhibit
religion the key factor. 48 The title VII exemption apparently was
intended to neutralize the impact of title VII on religious practice,
rather than to advance religion.49 Neutralization of governmental
regulation implies neither advancement nor inhibition of religion.
Although it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish between advancement of religion and avoidance of restrictions on religious
,exercise, religion-based exemptions to other general statutory
schemes have been upheld.50 Therefore the exemption by itself does
not so advance religion as to run afoul of the primary purpose test.
The King's Garden court found that the title VII exemption
fails under the second prong of the Nyquist standard, the primary
effect test, because it puts religious organizations in a privileged
position with respect to other employers.61 However, the distinction
discussed in the context of the secular purpose test is also applicable
46. 498 F.2d at 55. The secular purpose test is examined in Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260, 277-83 (1968),
47. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Epperson grounded the decision to strike down a statute
squarely on the secular purpose test, whereas Nyquist found adequate nonsectarian
state purposes and rested on the primary effect test. Thus the phrasing of the secular
purpose ~est in Epperson is perhaps a more appropriate gauge of the Court's meaning.
48. 393 U.S. at 107.
49. 118 CONG. R.Ec. 2311, 4503 (1972) (remarks by Senators Spong and Ervin).
50. See; e.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970); United States v.
Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (exemption from draft for ministers):
Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dept. Store, 357 S.W.2d 703 (Ky.), dismissed for want of
substantial federal question sub nom. Arlan's Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218
(1962) (exemption from Sunday closing law for Saturday Sabbath observers).
51. 498 F.2d at 55.
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here: It can be argued that the effect of the exemption is to neutralize the impact of title VII on religious exercise rather than to
advance religion. The exemption does permit religious employers to
do something that is forbidden to secular employers, but it is not
easy to decide whether it confers a sufficiently substantial benefit
on religious employers that religion is thereby "advanced."52 Another mode of analysis is required to decide this difficult questi~n.
Indeed, the Nyquist test may be inapplicable to cases dealing
with ·exemptions from statutory burdens. The test was developed
in cases involving direct state aid to religious organizations,53 and
much of the judicial explication of the test does not seem to be
transferable to exemptions.54 The Nyquist test was ignored in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,55 in which the Court fashioned a judicial
52. At least in parochial aid cases, the primary effect test is violated if the effect
of advancing religion is significant, regardless of the relative strength of other effects.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (majority
opinion), 823 (White, J., dissenting) (1973); Morgan, The Establishment Clause and
Sectarian Schools: A. Final Installment?, 1973 SUP. Cr. REv. 57, 78-79 (1974). In exemp•
tion cases, one might argue that the effect of advancing religion must predominate
before the exemption fails.
53. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt
v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v. Rich•
ardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Tests similar to
one or more of the Nyquist prongs have been used in various cases not involving fi.
nancial aid. E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968); School Dist. of Abing•
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
402, 445, 453 (1961).
54. Consider, for example, the following recent explanation of the primary effect
test: "Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial por•
tion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifi•
cally religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting." Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973). By contrast, as the King's Garden court recognized, 498 F.2d
at 56, the case for holding the religious discrimination exemption unconstitutional
gains strength rather than weakens as the institutions to which the exemption applies
engage in essentially secular activities separable from religious functions.
55. 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972). Although Yoder was decided before Nyquist, the
Court had already announced a substantially similar version of the Nyquist test in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The holding that the establishment clause

issues were made irrelevant by the overriding requirements of the free exercise clause
may explain the Court's failure to use the Nyquist/Lemon test in Yoder.
Chief Justice Burger has warned against mechanical application of the language of
one case with respect to the religion clauses to a new fact situagon:
In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the Court's
opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general principles on a
case-by-case basis. The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the
Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on
aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to particular cases but have
limited meaning as general principles.
Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). It has been suggested that the Nyquist
formulation is too rigid even for the area in which it has developed, and that its future
is "problematic." Note, A. Workable Definition of the Establishment Clause, 62 GEo.
L.J. 1461, 1481 (1974).
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exemption for religious groups from a state compulsory secondary
education law. Examinations of the extent to which the exemption
furthers the evils at which the establishment clause was directed and
the extent to which the exemption furthers the values underlying
the establishment clause afford alternative modes of analyzing
alleged establishment clause infringement.
The Supreme Court has identified the evils at which the establishment clause was directed as "sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."1i 0 The
exemption avoids the third evil by excluding religious organizations
from governmental regulation as far as religious discrimination is
concerned. The King's Garden court, however, seemed to imply
that the title VII exemption does constitute financial support of
religion. 57 Certainly, the exemption does not provide direct financial
aid to religious organizations. But it is not clear that the exemption
confers no indirect economic benefits. Because under the exemption
religious organizations can engage in discrimination that is forbidden to secular employers, it is possible that the exemption confers some competitive advantage on such organizations.
The religion of a business' employees, like their race, is generally
economically irrelevant.58 A business that discriminates according
to economically irrelevant criteria does not thereby gain a competitive advantage.59 There are, however, several ways in which the
ability to discriminate according to religion in hiring might be commercially relevant.
One financial benefit the exemption may confer on religious
institutions is relief from the title VII duty imposed on secular
employers to make reasonable accommodation for the religious
practices of employees if such accommodation can be made without
56. Committee for Pub. Educ. 8: Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772
(1973), quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
57. The rourt emphasized sponsorship rather than financial support, but its concern over the danger of "extending the worldly influence" of wealthy sects suggests
that it believed the exemption to ronfer some financial advantages. 498 F.2d at 55.
58. Employee and customer religious prejudices might influence the success of a
business, but these factoxs are not themselves strictly "rommercial," and the congressional hearings on title VII revealed no evidence that such factoxs do influence an en•
terprise's business success. The diversity of American religious beliefs makes it unlikely
that they would.
An organization able to hire only employees of a particular religion might also
benefit from increased worker productivity because the workexs believe they are working for a "higher" goal in the good of their religion. If there is such a benefit, however, it arises not from the differential impact of title VII but from the different
natures of secular and religious institutions. The exemption enables religious institutions to retain the benefit, if any, but it does not create it. In any case, it is unlikely
that religion rorrelates so significantly with worker capability as to make it worth•
while for an employer to use religion as a hiring test rather than tests that directly
measure job-related capabilities,
59. See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14, 19-38 (2d ed. 1971).
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causing undue hardship with respect to the conduct of the employer's business.60 Language making reasonable accommodation
an explicit requirement of the title VII duty not to discriminate
on the basis of religion was added in 1972,61 at the same time
that the exemption for religious organizations was broadened.
The requirement was added to express Congress' intent to forbid
not only intentional discrimination but all employer requirements
without reasonable commercial justification that have the effect of
discrimination because they conflict with actions required by the
faith of one or more religious groups.62 It is unclear whether title
VII implicitly contained the requirement of reasonable accommodation before the 1972 amendment.63
The cases concerning employees who refused to work on Friday
nights or Saturday because they observe their Sabbath at that time64
indicate that the courts have been unwilling to interpret the 1972
amendment to impose any substantial financial burden on employers
or any hardship on the workers' fellow employees. If the employer
cannot schedule another employee to replace the Saturday Sabbath
observer, the hardship to the employer will probably be deemed
60, The reasonable accommodation requirement is contained in title VIl's definition of religion as including "all aspects of religious observance and practices, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000eG) (Supp.
II, 1972),
61. Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000-e(j) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1970).
62. My own pastor in this area ••• has expressed his concern and distress that
there are certain faiths that are having a very difficult time, especially with the
younger people, and understandably so, with reference to a possible inability of
employers on some occasions to adjust work schedules to fit the requirements of
the faith of some of their workers.
The term "religion" as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses, as I
understand it, the same concepts as are included in the first amendment - not
merely belief, but also conduct; the freedom to believe and also the freedom to
act.
118 CONG, R.Ec. 705 (1972) (remarks of Senator Randolph) (emphasis added). Senator
Randolph was the sponsor of the reasonable accommodation amendment. His complaint about employer "inability'' to adjust work schedules, rather than "unwillingness" to adjust them or "difficulty" in adjusting them, seems to indicate that undue
hardship was not intended to be an easily satisfied defense.
63. Compare Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), afjd. by
an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), with Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d
1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
64. There are other ways in which an employee's religious beliefs or practices might
conflict with employment requirements. See, e.g., Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp.,
501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974) (conflict with payment of union dues); Dec. No. 71-2620
(1971), CCH EEOC DEC. ,i 6283 (1973) (conflict with employer dress codes); Eastern
Greyhound Lines Div. of Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 27
N.Y.2d 279, 265 N.E.2d 745, 317 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1970) (conflict with employer proscription against beards).
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"undue." 65 On the other hand, where there are open positions requiring no Saturday work to which the Saturday Sabbath observer
can be shifted without violating seniority rules or forcing the employer to pay overtime, employer refusal to make such an accommodation has been held unreasonable. 66 Similarly, burdens on managerial time necessitated by the rescheduling of employees' work
periods have been held not to be undue hardships. 67 But no accommodation has been required where it could be accomplished only
by a violation of other employees' seniority rights,68 or where the result
would be either to leave the Saturday work crew shorthanded or to
force the employer to pay premium wages to a substitute. 00 One
district court has stated that "[t]itle VII cannot be interpreted to
require that companies :finance employee's [sic] religious beliefs." 70
Although one case has held that an employer's refusal to accommodate is unreasonable despite the possibility that accommodation
would lead to adverse effects on employee morale or the necessity
of paying additional overtime to a substitute,71 that case may have
been based on a :finding that the defendant's evidence had not
demonstrated such hardships.72
The tendency of the courts to limit the employer accommodation required by title VII to actions not involving :financial hardship
or violation of employee seniority rights may not fully implement
the intent of Congress to strengthen title VII's ban on religious
discrimination.78 However, the establishment clause may prohibit
a rule that falls more harshly upon employers or fellow workers. 74
A statute that forces hardships on others in order to enhance the
65. See, e.g., Dec. No. 70-773 (1970), CCH EEOC DECISIONS ,I 6154 (1973); 29 C.F,R,
§ 1605.l(b) (1974). Cf. MA.s.s. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 4.lA (Supp. 1974).

66. Shaffield v. Northrup Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D,
Ala. 1974); Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
67. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973),
68. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974); Hardison v.
Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 ()N .D. Mo. 1974). But see Edwards &: Kaplan,
supra note 41, at 628 (arguing that reasonable accommodation unwisely requires the
employer to ignore the rights of other employees).
69. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (;,V.D. Mo. 1974), Cf. Powell v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2 CCH EMPL, PRAc. GUIDE ,I 5139 (Ill. Fair Empl.
Prac. Commn., Feb. 20, 1973),
70. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877, 891 (;,V.D. Mo. 1974).
71, Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684 (;,V.D. Tenn. 1973).
72, The burden of proving undue hardship is on the employer. 29 C.F.R, § 1605,l(c)
(1974).
73. See the remarks of Senator Randolph quoted note 62 supra.
74. Doubts over the reasonable accommodation standard's constitutionality strongly
influenced the decisions in Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334.35 (6th
Cir. 1970), afjd. by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), and Hardison v.
Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877, 882·83 (;,V.D. Mo, 1974). The constitutional
argument is developed in Edwards &: Kaplan, supra note 41, at 628,
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ability of some employees to observe their Sabbath on Saturday
prefers religious reasons for not working on Saturday over nonreligious reasons, such as wanting to play golf or to be with one's
family. 75 By imposing financial hardship on employers or requiring
infringement of fellow workers' seniority rights, the state requires
these parties in effect to finance the religious practi~es of some employees, in violation of the establishment clause.76 Although decisions under the establishment clause have come to be characterized
by an attitude of "benevolent neutrality," which permits some
accommodation to and preferment of religion in order to safeguard
free exercise values,77 it is not clear that this approach should apply
to the reasonable accommodation requirement of title VII. Benevolent neutrality allows a legislature some discretion in navigating
between the competing demands that the free exercise and establishment clauses make on government.78 Thus, the decisions expressing
this attitude have usually involved religious exemption from government-imposed duties. 79 The title VII requirement of reasonable
accommodation, however, aims only at preventing discrimination
by private individuals. I~ does not have a free exercise basis because
the free exercise clause restricts only governmental interference with
the practice of religion. so There is therefore no need to adopt a
flexible attitude toward the accommodation requirement under the
establishment clause because countervailing free. exercise considerations are not present.81
75. This establishment problem would disappear if one defined all such desires, at
least if they are strongly held, as "religious." See Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection: Antiquated Oddity or Vital Reality, 34 Omo ST. L.J. 15, 76-77 (1973).
76. See text at note 56 supra.
77. See text at note 130 infra.
78. See text at note 142 infra.
79. E.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970); United States v. Branigan, 299
F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MICH. L. REv. 179, 198 (1970).
80. Justice Douglas has characterized the first amendment as containing the "command ••• that no one need bow to the religious beliefs of another." McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 575 (1961) (dissenting opinion). See United States Natl. Bank
v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 543, 275 P.2d 860, 866 (1954); Ginsberg v. Yeshiva of Far
Rockaway, 45 App. Div. 2d 334, 358 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1974). But cf. Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946). Marsh did use the free exercise clause as a restraint on the conduct of a private party, but only because that party performed "essentially a public
!unction," 326 U.S. at 506, and availed itself of state criminal laws.
81. However, Senator Williams, floor manager of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, thought that the reasonable accommodation requirement was consistent with the Constitution because it promoted free exercise. See 118 CoNG. REc.
706 (1972). Thus one might argue that the reasonable accommodation requirement
does have a constitutional basis. See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d .1227 (8th Cir. 1971)
(en bane). Cf. Sossin Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 S.2d 28 (Fla. App. 1972)
(upholding against establishment clause challenge a criminal statute prohibiting the
fraudulent representation of nonkosher food as kosher because statute promotes free
exercise). But see People v. Goldberger, 35 N.Y. Crim. 328, 331-36, 168 N.Y.S. 578,
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Other burdens imposed on secular employers by title VII that
the broadened exemption may spare to religious employers are
litigation costs and penalties for noncompliance, including back-pay
awards.82 Of course, secular employers need not violate the statute,
but even full compliance by a secular employer does not guarantee
immunity from claims of religious discrimination. However, the
provision of title VII giving the courts discretion to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party83 should reduce these costs. Moreover, because of doubts about the constitutionality of the title VII
exemption, as expressed in King's Garden, even religious employers
may not be exempt from litigation costs associated with the title VII
ban on religious discrimination.
Although the title VII exemption may confer an indirect economic benefit on religious organizations, especially with regard to
litigation costs and the requirement of reasonable accommodation,
such benefits are too speculative to constitute the evil of financial
support. Even the conferral of definite indirect economic benefits
on religion is not always unconstitutional according to Walz v. Tax
Commission,84 which upheld a tax exemption for church-owned real
property.85
The arguments that the title VII exemption sponsors religion
likewise seems weak. Sponsorship is the official sanctioning of a
particular religion, or of religion in general. It lends to religion
"a character of orthodoxy and acceptability," which in tum helps
seduce conscience "both from irreligion and the t~achings of rival
groups."86 The King's Garden court concluded that the title VII
exemption was tainted by sponsorship because it gives religious
groups preferential treatment in the imposition of a general statutory burden.87
In reaching this conclusion, the court apparently relied on
Reitman v. Mulkey,88 in which the Supreme Court overturned a
California constitutional amendment that guaranteed citizens a
580-83 (Spec. Sess. 1916) (Freschi, J., dissenting) (statute prohibiting fraudulent reprc•
scntation of nonkosher food as kosher could be upheld without resort to free exercise
clause); Note, Enforceability of Religious Law in Secular Courts-It's Kosher, But Is
It Constitutional?, 71 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1641, 1651-53 (1973).
The constitutionality of the reasonable accommodation standard was upheld against
an establishment clause challenge, without resort to the free exercise clause, in Hardison
v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
77, 85
87.
88.

See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684 (!,V .D. Tenn. 1973).
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
See text at notes 99-100 infra.
Note, Toward a Uniform Evaluation of the Religion Guarantees, 80 YALE L.J.
(1970) (speaks of "sanctioning" instead of "sponsorship'}
498 F.2d at 55.
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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right to discriminate on racial grounds in the sale or rental of
residential real estate. Although California was not bound by the
federal Constitution to forbid private discrimination,89 the constitutional authorization was held to constitute state encouragement
of discrimination.90 This encouragement involved the state in private racial discrimination91 and hence amounted to unconstitutional
state action.92 By analogy to Reitman, it could be argued that the
title VII exemption encourages religion in violation of the establishment clause by placing the prestige of state approval behind religious groups.
This argument is weak for several reasons. First, it seems unlikely that an exemption from a proscription on religious discrimination enhances the prestige of religion. Second, it is not clear that
the title VII exemption is sufficiently similar to the constitutional
amendment involved in Reitman for that case to be controlling.93
A third and more important flaw in the analogy is that the 1972
title VII exemption protects-at least at its core-rights that come
within the free exercise clause,94 whereas the California constitutional amendment permitting racial discrimination protected acts
that were not guaranteed protection by the federal Constitution.95 To
the extent that the title VII exemption goes beyond the minimum
requirements of the free exercise clause, it too may lack a constitutional basis. However, because of the difficulty in determining with
precision how much of an exemption the free exercise clause requires, the enactment of the exemption might as well be viewed as
an attempt to comply with the Constitution in an unclear area of
the law as governmental sponsorship of religion. Furthermore,
special treatment for religion beyond the requirements of the Constitution is not necessarily sponsorship. In Walz v. Tax Commission96 a property tax exemption for church-owned real property was
held not to confer government sponsorship upon religion,97 despite
the fact that the Court did not hold that the exemption was required
by the free exercise clause. It might be argued that Walz involved a
lesser degree of government approval than the title VII exemption
because religious institutions were not singled out for separate treatment but rather formed part of a larger class receiving the tax
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

387
387
387
387

U.S. at 374-75.
U.S. at 375.
U.S. at 378-79.
U.S. at 375.
See text preceding note 106 infra.
94. See text at notes 22-34 supra.
95. Cf. King, Rebuilding the "Fallen House"-Tuition Grants for Elementary and
Secondary Education, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1087-88 (1971).
96. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
97. 397 U.S. at 675.
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benefit.98 However, it can also be argued that the Walt situation
comes closer to sponsorship. The Court assumed that the Walz
exemption conferred an indirect economic benefit on churches,00
but it was not sponsorship because it involved no direct economic
benefit.100 If the distinction between direct and indirect benefit was
sufficient to avoid classifying the Walz exemption as sponsorship, it
is difficult to see how the title VII exemption, which involves at most
very minor indirect economic benefits,101 can be guilty of this evil.
Thus the broadened title VII exemption for religious organizations does not seem to further to a substantial degree any of the evils
at which the establishment clause is aimed.
Another method of approaching establishment clause questions
is to ask whether the law in question infringes on any of the values
that various authorities have identified as those the establishment
clause was designed to protect. Professor Schwarz has identified "no
imposition of religion" as the core establishment clause value.102
Under this view, the establishment clause protects individual and
family determinations of religious choice from governmental interference.103 The title VII exemption is consistent with this value.
The possible financial advantages to be gained by being able to discriminate with respect to religion in hiring are too uncertain to
influence entrepreneurs to become religious and to change their
enterprises into religious corporations. Even if there were monetary
gain to be derived from religious discrimination, or even if the
psychic rewards of discriminating are strong enough to induce entrepreneurs to adopt the form of a religious association, the exemption
would not "impose" religion on anyone because the "no imposition" value is not concerned with false claims of belief, only with
induced belief.104 The prospective employee of a discriminating
religious organization, who would have to adopt a religion or forgo
an employment opportunity, might be influenced in his religious
choice, but any such imposition would be by the discriminating
private employer and not by the government. It might be argued,
98. 397 U.S. at 696-97 (Harlan, J., concurring). However, the property tax exemp•
tion has been viewed as a special preference for religious groups. E.g., A. BALK, TH£
FREE Lrsr 28-44 (1971); M. LARsoN &: c. LOWELL, THE CHURCHES: THEIR RICHES, REvENUES AND lMMUNITIES (1969).
99. 397 U.S. at 674, 690 (Brennan, J., concurring), 699 (Harlan, J., concurring), 704
(Douglas, J., dissenting). But see Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78
YALE L.J. 1285 (1969).
100. 397 U.S. at 675.
IOI. See text at notes 58-83 supra.
102. Schwarz, The Nonestablishment Prindple: A Reply to Professor Giannella, 81
HARV. L. REv. 1465 (1968); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment
Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968).
103. Schwarz, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1465, supra note 102, at 1465.
104. Schwarz, 77 YALE L.J., supra note 102, at 724-25.
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on the strength of Reitman, that government permission for limited
private imposition of religion is the equivalent of state imposition
of religion. This argument is inconsistent ·with the view, conceded
by the Kinfts Garden court, that the religion clauses of the Constitution do not require Congress to enact a general ban on religious
discrimination.105 It can also be argued from Reitman that repeal of
a law prohibiting certain private discrimination involves the state
more deeply in discrimination than would have been the case if
the state had never enacted the law in the first place. The state constitutional amendment in Reitman permitting private discrimination in the sale or rental of private housing had the effect of
repealing California's fair housing laws. Similarly, the 1972 broadening of the title VII exemption effectively repealed the earlier ban
on religious discrimination by religious organizations in their nonreligious activities. Some might view this repeal as state involvement
in religious imposition by religious employers, even though the
state is not constitutionally required to enact a general ban on
religious discrimination. However, in Reitman California's fair
housing acts were not merely repealed by a change in state statutes;
the change was effected by amendment of the state constitution, an
action that insulated the change from reversal through the normal
political processes.106 Finally, it is doubtful that the Reitman reasoning should be extended in the area of the title VII exemption,
where the legislature is caught between the conflicting demands of
the religion clauses.101
Another commentator has urged that the establishment clause,
in conjunction with the free exercise clause, protects free adoption,
observance, and propagation of religion.108 To the extent that these
values are equivalent to Professor Schwarz's no imposition value,
the foregoing discussion shows that the title VII exemption is not
inconsistent with them. However, this formulation leads to a much
broader reading of the establishment clause than that suggested by
Professor Schwarz. For example, aid that merely deepens rather than
105. 498 F.2d at 55.
106. The Supreme Court emphasized that the law struck down in Reitman was an
amendment to the California Constitution. 387 U.S. at 377. See also, e.g., Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, The Supreme
Court 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 73-79 (1967). A further factual distinction between Reitman and the title VII exemption is that the amendment struck down in
Reitman was actually aimed at blacks and other minority groups. Black, supra, at 82.
The title VII amendment does not work to the disadvantage of any particular religion,
nor was it intended to do so.
107. See text at note 94 supra. For analyses of the weakness of the state action argument, see Karst & Horowitz, Rietman v. Mulkey: A Teleophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 39; White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession:
The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 WIS. L. REv. 503, fi05.
108. Note, supra note 86.
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induces faith would be unconstitutional under this theory because it
would interfere with the rights of others not to have their proselytization efforts frustrated by governmental action. 100 A religious
group that may permissibly provide jobs for its members, and no
others, may succeed in intensifying the religious beliefs of its members by reducing their contacts with nonbelievers. However, as
argued above with respect to imposition of religion, one can argue
that the intensification of religious belief in this situation is caused
by private action, and not by governmental permission.
Perhaps the two values most frequently mentioned as being at
the heart of the establishment clause are "voluntarism" and "neutrality."110 Voluntarism requires that the state neither encourage
nor discourage participation in religious life.111 An exemption for
religious organizations from a general proscription on religious
discrimination would not seem to infringe on this value because the
resultant encouragement, if any, would not be state action. 112
More difficult is the question whether the exemption is in conformance with the value of neutrality. Neutrality has been called
"a notoriously difficult concept";113 it was the basis of the court's
decision in King's Garden. 114 The court apparently applied the
"strict neutrality" standard advocated by Professor Kurland.110 According to Kurland, ''the proper construction of the religion clauses
of the first amendment is that the freedom and separation clauses
should be read as a single precept that government cannot utilize
109. Id. at 92 n.73. Such aid would be allowed by Professor Schwarz. Schwarz, 77
YALE L.J. 692, supra note 102, at 724-25.
110. E.g., Walz v. Tax: Commn,, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
111. Walz v. Tax: Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
112. Cf. text following note 104 supra.
113. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974).
114. 498 F,2d at 55-57.
115. See 498 F-2d at 56-57. The court also discussed cases applying a "benevolent
neutrality" standard, see text at notes 128-30 infra, but thought they were "isolated
decisions creat[ing] no precedent." 498 F.2d at 56.
Professor Kurland refers to his standard as a "neutral principle," P. KURLAND,
RELIGION AND THE LAw 15 (1962), and as "the neutrality principle," Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75
W. VA. L. REv. 213, 237 (1973). There is wide agreement that "neutrality" is a goal
of the establishment clause, but there is no widely accepted definition of the term,
CJ. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) (strict ncu•
trality not required by first amendment because first amendment makes religious classification); w. KATZ, RELIGION AND .AMmuCAN CoNSTITUTIONS passim (1964). According to
at least one commentator, the Supreme Court, although continuing to invoke the
"neutrality" concept, has deprived it of any significant content, Kauper, The Supreme
Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Everson?, 25 CAsE W. REs. L. REv, 107,
126 (1974). Kurland's neutrality test is now generally referred to as "strict neutrality."
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part 11,
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 513 (1968); Kauper, supra note
79, at 198.
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religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses
prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit
or to impose a burden."116 The prime virtue of the strict neutrality
test is that it promotes certainty and equality in the law.117 Because
the broadened title VII exemption "obviously creates a classification
of a strictly religious character,"118 it is inconsistent with strict
neutrality and therefore supposedly unconstitutional.119
Although Justice Harlan adopted the Kurland position,120 it has
been rejected by the Court as a whole,121 as Professor Kurland has
himself acknowledged.122 The rejection of the strict neutrality principle has been most evident in cases that involve exemptions from
generally imposed duties for religiously motivated activities.123 For
example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder124 the Court held that a state must
grant the Amish an exemption from compulsory school attendance,
and in Sherbert v. Verner125 the Court decided that a state must
carve out for Seventh Day Adventists and other Saturday Sabbath
observers an exemption to the requirement that those seeking unemployment compensation benefits be available for work on Saturdays. Thus, the establishment clause must apparently give way when
116. P. KURLAND, supra note 115, at 18.
117. Id. at II2.
118. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir, 1974), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974).
119. Professor Kurland has warned that his principle should not be applied me•
chanically, P. KURLAND, supra note 115, at 18, 112, but he has not specified under what
circumstances it should not be applied.
120. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356-61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See Kauper, supra
note 79, at 198.
121. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting);
Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961); Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dept. Store,
357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky.), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question
sub nom. Arlan's Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962). The rejection of Kurland's theory has been noted by the commentators. E.g., Kauper, supra note 79, at
198-200; Note, Voucher Systems of Public Education After Nyquist and Sloan: Can a
Constitutional System Be Devised?, 72 MICH, L. REv. 895, 897-98 (1974).
122. Kurland, supra note 115, at 237.
123. See United States v. Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal, Rptr. 69 (1964); In re Jenison, 267 Minn.
136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963); cases cited note 121 supra. But cf. Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting claim that Mormon belief in polygamy is defense
to bigamy prosecution).
124. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court stated that it "must not ignore the danger that
an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run
afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any
exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the
right of free exercise." 406 U.S. at 220.
125. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Sherbert is not easily reconcilable with earlier establishment clause cases. 374 U.S. at 416 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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it conflicts with the "favored child of the first amendment,"126 the
free exercise clause.127
Moreover, neutrality has been held to permit exemptions for
religious groups or religiously motivated activities in instances in
which an exemption is not required by the free exercise clause.128
Walz v. Tax Commission,129 in which the Court upheld a property
tax exemption for churches, employed a "benevolent neutrality"
test, which permits some "play in the joints" between the two religion clauses of the first amendment. 130 The result in Walz is not inconsistent with strict neutrality because the exemption was also extended to nonprofit institutions generally.131 But the Court has also
upheld exemptions that did not have broader, nonreligious aspects.
For example, the Court has upheld the conscientious objector provision of the draft law against the argument that it established those
religions or religious beliefs that opposed all wars, not just unjust
wars,132 and the Court refused to strike down a "released time" program, which exempted students from class attendance provided they
received religious instruction during the released time:133 While the
Court has not required an exemption from Sunday closing laws for
Saturday Sabbath observers,134 it has indicated that such an exemption is not constitutionally forbidden. 136
Given that the neutrality principle allows some "play in the
joints" even where free exercise values do not defeat an establishment clause challenge, it is relevant to consider the important
interests served by the broadened title VII exemption. The exemption would protect religious institutions from the indignities of
126. Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1142 (1973).
127. One commentator would explain this result on the ground that resolution of

the conflict between the religion clauses "requires a value judgment as to which (of
the religion clauses] is to become dominant when there is a conflict-the one premised
on a vital civil right [the free exercise clause], or the one premised on an outmoded
eighteenth century political theory (the establishment clause]." Giannella, supra note
37, at 1389.
128. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (dictum); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 598 (1942) (dictum),
_revd. on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Shetreet, supra note 29, at 405.
129. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
130. 397 U.S. at 669; Kauper, supra note 79, at 198.
131. 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring).
132. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). It is not clear whether the con•
scientious objector provision is a required exemption or merely a permissible one.
Shetreet, supra note 29, at 405-06.
133. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
134-. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Kurland, supra note 115, at 244,
135. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961); Commonwealth v, Arlan's
Dept. Store, 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky.), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal
question sub nom. Arlan's Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962). Contra, City
of Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Ann. 671 (1874).
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being unfairly accused of bias and of having their employment practices examined unnecessarily by the courts.136 A rule that religious
institutions are not subject to the religious discrimination provisions of title VII is more certain than a rule that would accommodate what has been suggested as the minimum required by the free
exercise clause-an exemption for a religious organization when its
religiously discriminatory hiring practices are founded on a desire
to further the. exercise or spread of its faith. 137 The minimum
exemption may or may not cover many activities. Uncertainty will
breed litigation, and the fear of court review invited by the minimum exemption might have a "chilling effect" 138 on the exercise of
religious liberty that could be avoided by the broader exemption.139
The mechanics of applying the benevolent neutrality principle
have not been clearly set out by the courts or commentators. There
are at least three possible approaches to reconciling the competing
requirements of the religion clauses of the Constitution. One would
be to grant the legislature wide discretion by applying the establishment clause tests in a nonrigorous fashion, reserving them in
effect only to correct gross legislative abuses.140 Another possible
approach would be to determine the free exercise values and the
degree of establishment clause infringement separately for each case,
weighing them against each other on a scale weighted in favor of
free exercise values. Finally, free exercise values could be imported
directly and candidly into the establishment clause test by recognizing the purpose and effect of preserving free exercise as satisfying
the secular purpose and primary effect prongs, respectively, of the
Nyquist standard.141 This final approach probably leads to the same
results as the first suggested approach; the purpose and effect of
giving wide berth to the demands of the free exercise clause would
fail to satisfy the two critical prongs of the Nyquist standard only
if the legislature has grossly abused its discretion. The balancing
test will also lead to similar results, because only a gross violation
of the establishment clause will overcome the presumption in favor
136. Cf. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathe•
dral, 344 U.S. 745 (1966); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
137. See text at notes 20-34 supra.
·
138. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1965).
139. However, in view of the ease with which a religious organization could probably show a religious purpose behind its employment discrimination, at least where
the exercise of its religion really is involved, it is arguable that the minimum exemption would involve no significant "chilling effect."
140. Compare Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and United States v. Braiiigan, 299 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), with Committee for Pub. Educ. 8: Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
141. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971); text following notes 46,
51 supra.
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of free exercise. Indeed, granting the legislature wide discretion
seems a fitting result under benevolent neutrality if, as has been
suggested, the purpose of the doctrine is to relieve the legislature
of the necessity of charting a tortuous course between the Scylla of
free exercise and the Charybdis of establishment.142
Thus under benevolent neutrality, no matter how applied, the
1972 version of the title VII exemption should be upheld. The
manner in which the exemption violates the establishment clause is
not clear, nor are the requirements of the free exercise clause so
sharply delineated that one can determine with assurance the extent
to which the 1972 exemption is required by the free exercise clause.
Congress' judgment on the proper scope of the exemption should
therefore be respected.148
142. W. KATZ, supra note 115, at 75,
143. This analysis of the constitutional validity of the title VII exemption also ii·
luminates several interpretative issues that may arise under the present exemption. One
obvious issue is the scope of the phrase "religious corporation, association, educational
institution, or society," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e--l (Supp. II, 1972), to which the exemption
applies. In light of the 1972 amendment, it seems clear that Congress did not intend
to limit the phrase to associations formed for the sole purpose of effectuating religious
ideals. Even before the 1972 amendment, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com•
mission bad construed the exemption to apply to a religious hospital. Dec. No. 70-332
(1969), CCH EEOC DECISIONS 1J 6080 (1973). However, the discussion of the free ex•
ercise basis for the exemption suggests that the religious purposes of an organization
should have to be significant in relation to its other goals in order for the organization
to come within the exemption.
In evaluating the significance of an organization's religious goals, it will be necessary to decide what sort of belief systems are "religious." The courts seem inclined to
give the term a broad meaning. E.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11
(1961); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied because
petition not timely filed, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537
(S.D. Iowa 1973), affd., 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 43 U.S.L,W. 3274 (U.S.
Nov. 11, 1974); Cowen v. Lily Dale Assembly, 44 App. Div. 2d 772, 354 N.Y.S.2d 269
(1974). A broad interpretation is necessary to avoid aggravating establishment clause
problems.
The exemption also fails to state clearly whether it authorizes religious discrim•
ination in employment by religious organizations only if the discrimination is in favor
of a member of the organization's faith or whether it also permits the organization to
hire adherents of a second religion over those of a third. See note 3 supra. Cf.
MAss. LAWS ANN, ch. 151B, § 1.5 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REv. STAT, § 659.020(2) (1974),
The probable intent of Congress was to allow religious organizations to discrimi•
nate against particular religious or irreligious persons without discriminating
against all other faiths. See 118 CONG. REc. 4503 (1972) (remarks of Senator Ervin);
EEOC, supra note 22, at 3208 (1968) (debate on exemption codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e--2(e)(2) (1970), which contains the same language as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (Supp,
II, 1972)). Free exercise requirements reinforce this interpretation. For example, a sect
might desire to protect the employees of its hospital who are members of the sect
from constant proselytization during work. Therefore, without finding it desirable to
discriminate against all other faiths, the sect might discriminate in its hiring against
those religious groups whose members are required by their faith to proselytize, Simi·
Iarly, it seems reasonable to interpret the exemption to permit a l\fissouri Synod Lutheran organization to blre other Lutherans before Catholics, and Catholics before
atheists.

